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Background and Motivation
• A Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) capability is required for UAS 
to meet the requirement in CFR 91.113 to “see and 
avoid” other aircraft and maintain “well clear”.
• RTCA Special Committee 228 is developing Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA 
systems.
• A surveillance system is a critical component of DAA 
system to detect and track intruder aircraft. Thus, the 
MOPS will include surveillance system requirements.
• Encounter characteristics of “well-clear” violations 
between UAS and manned aircraft have not been 
investigated.
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Objectives
• Investigate unmitigated encounter 
characteristics of well-clear violations between 
UAS and cooperative VFR aircraft in Class E 
airspace
• Investigate the relationship between encounters 
to surveillance system characteristics in terms of 
detection range and fields of regard (FOR)
– the effect of surveillance volumes on the ratio of 
undetected well-clear violations (WCV)  
– the time to WCV of intruders with different 
surveillance volumes
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Concept of Well Clear Violation
• Airborne separation standard
• Time and distance-based definition of “Well-Clear Violation” 
– When two aircraft are within distance thresholds
– When the projected closest point of approach (CPA) of two aircraft is 
within a distance-based volume in particular time thresholds 
• Similar to Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II alerting 
logic and criteria
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NAS-Wide Air Traffic Simulation
• Airspace Concept 
Evaluation System 
(ACES) 
– Simulate NAS-wide air 
traffic operations and 
encounters between 
UAS and VFR traffic
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• Traffic scenario for a single day 
- Historical cooperative VFR traffic 
• Air Defense radar data on July 25, 2012
• Total    26,770 flights,    24,838 flight hours
- Proposed UAS flights 
• Various types of UAS missions generated by Intelligent 
Automation Inc. 
• Total   18,262 flights,     18,900 flight hours
Simulation Results and Analysis
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Effects of Surveillance Parameters
• Selected sets of surveillance parameters
– Surveillance Range:  6, 10, 20 nmi
– Horizontal Field of Regard: (±) 60, 90, 120, 180 deg
– Vertical Field of Regard: (±) 20, 40 deg
– Total 24 sets of surveillance parameters (3*4*2)
• Analysis for undetected WCV
– Metric: Ratio of the number of undetected WCV to the total 
number of WCV for a given set of surveillance parameters
• Analysis for Detected WCV
– Metric: Time to WCV of threats at first detection with a 
given set of surveillance parameters
AUVSI 2014 11
Ratio of Undetected WCV
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Analysis of the Time to WCV
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Concluding Remarks
• Analyzed and built a database for well-clear 
violations between UAS and VFR traffic
– Allow system designers to conduct trade space analysis
• The ratio of undetected WCV was substantially 
affected by horizontal field of regard
– 90% of WCV could be detected with a surveillance volume 
(6nmi, ±120°, ±20°)
• The time to WCV was most sensitive to surveillance 
detection range 
• 90% of threats could be detected at least 60 sec before the 
violation with a surveillance volume (10nmi, ±90°, ±20°)
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Future Works
• Perform sensitivity analysis with multiple days of 
traffic 
– Effects of different traffic density of VFR and UAS traffic
– Effects of different UAS missions and flight characteristics
• Conduct mitigated surveillance study with a DAA 
system
– Effects of threat prediction and avoidance algorithms
• Use high-fidelity sensor models to detect intruder 
aircraft under uncertainty
• Investigate the effects of various definitions of well-
clear separation standard
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Questions?
• Paper to be published in AIAA Aviation, Technology, 
Integration, Operation (ATIO) 2014 conference 
Chunki Park, Seung Man Lee, and Eric Mueller 
“Investigating Detect-and-Avoid Surveillance 
Performance for Unmanned Aircraft Systems”
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Characteristics of UAS and VFR 
Flights
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Where€ 
Rxy ≤DMOD or (Pcpa ≤HMD and 0 ≤ TauMod ≤ TTHR)
and
€ 
Rz ≤ZTHR or (0 ≤ TCOA ≤ TCOA)
€ 
Rxy :Horizontal Range
€ 
PCPA : Predicted horizontal rangeat timeof closest point of approach
€ 
TauMod : Modified Tau
€ 
Rz : Relative Altitude
€ 
TCOA : Time to Co - Altitude
€ 
DMOD = 6000 ft
€ 
HMD = 6000 ft
€ 
ZTHR = 475 ft
€ 
TTHR = 30sec
€ 
TCOA = 20sec
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